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On Afghan Footbaths and Sacred Cows in Kosovo: Urban Legends 
of Intervention 
 
Berit Bliesemann de Guevara and Florian P. Kühn 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Drawing on ideas of the narrative turn in social and cultural studies, this article explores 
the oral, informal side of communication in contexts of international peacebuilding 
interventions. It takes urban legends – entertaining stories about events that supposedly 
happened to ‘a friend of a friend’ and usually contain a moral – as methodological access 
road to the study of meta-narratives that underpin interveners’ understandings of 
themselves and the intervention context. Three categories of urban legends/meta-
narratives are discussed: legends about ‘the intervened’ whose common thread is 
barbarianism; legends about ‘the interveners’ which revolve around a meta-narrative of 
western/northern hubris; and legends about intercultural interactions, which reproduce a 
meta-narrative of cultural misunderstandings and intervention failure. Using Scott’s idea 
of public and hidden transcripts, we discuss possible functions of such narrations in the 
context of interventions. 
 
Keywords: intervention, peacebuilding, statebuilding, narrative, urban legend, anecdote, 
storytelling, communication 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Successful Condom Distribution 
 
A couple of years ago, a humanitarian organisation started distributing condoms as part of a 
program on HIV prevention in South Sudan. A lot of people regularly lined up to get the condoms. 
The organisation and its donor were very happy: the program was working well, the rural 
 2 
population was sensitised to the importance of using condoms. The population was very happy 
too: finally an organisation that understood their needs, and provided solid plastic containers to 
transport their tobacco crops. It took years for the organisation to realise the misunderstanding.
1
 
 
In international interventions, like in any sphere of life, there is a lively stock of informal, mostly 
oral information about what is happening in the respective countries and among the interveners. 
One form of such informal communication and knowledge production is that local and 
international actors narrate incidents they know about from hearsay, and claim to know people 
who actually experienced them. Such narrations, like the one cited above, are called urban 
legends.
2
 
Urban legends are short and have a ‘strong basic story-appeal, a foundation in actual 
belief, and a meaningful message or “moral”’3. They are told by someone credible and narrated in 
a believable style because the narrator actually believes them.
4
 Usually, their credibility is 
enhanced by discursively involving ‘a friend of a friend’, that is, trustworthiness of what is told is 
enhanced by social proximity. Urban legends are usually told between rather homogeneous 
groups, and take place in settings familiar to listeners. They may have their origins in actual 
events; often, however, they are just ‘too good to be true’.5 
In the course of field research in the Balkans and Afghanistan, we came across this kind 
of story with specific reference to intervention contexts. Expatriate peacebuilders and aid workers 
– civilian and military – told anecdotes to illustrate statements about their environs. Sometimes 
criticism within the expat community, e.g. between different intervention agencies of one 
mission, was voiced or illustrated in form of funny or horrifying legends. We also got to hear of 
                                                        
1
 Source: Story provided by Severine Autesserre, Columbia University, based on a confidential interview with a 
Sudanese journalist in Juba, April 2011. She heard similar stories involving different players, e.g. MSF, and a 
different use for the condoms, e.g. to carry water or homemade alcohol.  
2
 We use the most common English term for such anecdotes, despite a lively debate about whether the adjective 
‘urban’ is useful to describe this type of stories, which are neither told nor take place exclusively in urban settings.  
3
 Jan Harold Brunvand, The Vanishing Hitchhiker. American Urban Legends and Their Meanings (New 
York/London: W.W. Norton, 1981), 10. 
4
 For different narrating performances depending on whether the legend is believed or not see Gillian Bennett, 
‘Legend: Performance and Truth’, in Monsters with Iron Teeth. Perspectives on Contemporary Legend Vol. III, eds 
Gillian Bennett and Paul Smith (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1988), 13-36. 
5
 Jan Harold Brunvand, Too Good to Be True. The Colossal Book of Urban Legends (New York/London: W.W. 
Norton 1999). 
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stories circulated by local actors about the intervention and its international staff. We took these 
observations as a starting point for a research project on what we have termed ‘urban legends of 
intervention’6. 
By taking urban legends as methodological access road, the project aims at shedding light 
on implicit assumptions that guide actors in international peacebuilding interventions. Drawing 
on insights of several decades of folklorists’ research on urban legends – ‘stories that most people 
have heard as true accounts of real-life experience’7 – we explore whether such narrations in the 
specific setting of international interventions evolve around typical contents or themes (meta-
narratives) and discuss their possible functions. While intervention research usually focuses on 
official, formal communication in interventions based on standardised written exchanges, we are 
interested in the other, spoken and informal side of how the intervention is interpreted and retold. 
Urban legends and other stories help actors reflect on their own role in the intervention. 
By providing information about the situation in which they find themselves, legends are part of 
the framing of actors’ situation as such. Stories may also help deal with, and make sense of, 
contradictory phenomena that actors in interventions are confronted with. Often, legends contain 
alternative interpretations to the intervention’s official statements of aims and norms, constituting 
a form of verbal unofficial criticism. In a more instrumental sense, storytelling is also a strategy 
for aid organisations, the military and not least scholars to deal with the problem of transmitting a 
message: a story is always good to catch readers’ or listeners’ attention and highlight certain 
aspects of a problem.
8
 In this process, it is not necessary that what is told has actually – and 
verifiably – happened; as with all urban legends, what counts is that the story is believed and 
repeatedly retold. It is in this sense that the project reflects on informal forms of knowledge 
production and how they contribute to producing and reproducing cultural constructions of 
interveners and intervened. 
We first introduce concepts of storytelling, narration and meta-narratives and locate 
folklorist research on urban legends within the field. We then interpret samples of urban legends 
of intervention in three broad categories: legends about ‘the intervened’ which refer to a meta-
narrative of barbarianism; legends about ‘the interveners’ and their meta-narrative of 
                                                        
6
 See http://www.legends-of-intervention.com 
7
 Brunvand, Hitchhiker, xi. 
8
 E.g. GTZ, Wirkungen zielgerichtet kommunizieren: Storytelling für die Außendarstellung (Eschborn: Gesellschaft 
für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2009). 
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western/northern hubris; and legends about intercultural interactions, which draw on a meta-
narrative of cultural misunderstandings and intervention failure. Finally, drawing on James C. 
Scott’s ideas of public and hidden transcripts, we discuss three possible functions urban legends 
can assume for the international actors in the context of interventions: as valve for critique and 
doubts of the intervention; as a form of shedding light on opaque local contexts and of attaching 
meaning to social action; and as an aspect of expatriates’ social group cohesion and identity. 
 
 
Narration and storytelling in everyday life, and the concept of urban legends 
 
Research on narrations and storytelling has become en vogue in disciplines as distinct as 
anthropology, economics, political science and language studies. Besides a narrative turn in 
cultural studies, there is what may be called an evolving ‘narrative theory of culture’9, which can 
be used as a frame of reference for research on urban legends of intervention. From this 
perspective, stories help understand how people, as homo narrans, and their individual cognition 
are tightly connected to their social embeddedness. In theory, there are myriads of possible 
modes of communication. In practice, however, there is always a limit to the forms of 
communication individuals may choose, because a wide variety of communication modes may 
produce communication breakdown. Individuals understand well how they are influenced by, and 
part of, a group. This is why it is important to reflect the group situation constitutive for each type 
of communication. Within a system of communication, a certain durability – a factor of which is 
expectancy – is necessary to uphold common understandings that need not be reified constantly. 
These ‘relationship rules’ prescribe communication, while at the same time shaping self-images 
and identities.
10
 
Crucial for collecting stories as methodological approach to exploring meta-narratives is 
the idea that talk becomes true because humans are ensnarled in the communicative situation.
11
 
                                                        
9
 Ingo Schneider, ‘Über das multidisziplinäre Erzählen und die Vielfalt der Erzähltheorien’, in Erzählkultur. Beiträge 
zur kulturwissenschaftlichen Erzählforschung, ed. Rolf Wilhelm Brednich (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 
2009), 3-14. 
10
 Paul Watzlawick, Janet Beavin Bavelas, and Don D. Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication. A Study of 
Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), 129-34. 
11
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York et al.: Harper & 
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Whatever is talked about is part of a larger script, or an overarching narrative, which has no start 
and no end.
12
 Parts of this are meta-narratives, understood as ‘the implicit and usually invisible 
ideologies, systems, and assumptions which operate globally in a society to order knowledge and 
experience’.13 Stories are told ‘within a pre-established framework. [Story-telling] can constitute, 
mould or break the framework, but the stories will always be conditioned by it’.14 Meta-
narratives thus constitute the link between individual narrations or stories, understood both as 
replicating versions and antagonistic re-versions of a pre-text,
15
 establishing ‘supposedly 
transcendent and universal truth about a collective “self” and its relationship to other in-groups 
including “others”’.16 For the study of urban legends of intervention we may thus assume that 
these stories can be traced back to a limited number of meta-narratives that are anchored in the 
narrators’ culturally shaped understanding of the world.17 
Within the contextual frame there is conscious and unconscious knowledge present in 
thinking, recalling and narrating. As it is impossible to interpret what unconscious ingredients are 
contained in a narrative, one has to concentrate on what serves as a conscious basis to locate 
oneself within a narration: in hearing someone telling a story, the listener will locate herself 
within what is being told as if it happened to her. Even if we deny the existence of a collective 
conscience or collective identity, inter-subjective patterns of understanding can be identified. In 
effect, this may lead to a kind of – hardly intelligible – ‘second hand experience’, which is 
transported in narrations.
18
 
So what constitutes urban legends more specifically? Some definitions concentrate on 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Row, 1962), Chapter 5; Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Gesammelte Schriften, Band 2 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 213-239; Watzlawick, Beavin Bavelas and Jackson, Pragmatics, 259-271. 
12
 Schapp 1976 quoted in Albrecht Lehmann, ‘Homo narrans – Individuelle und kollektive Dimensionen des 
Erzählens’, in Erzählkultur, ed. Brednich, 59-70, 63. 
13
 John Stephens and Robyn McCallum, Retelling Stories, Framing Culture. Traditional Story and Metanarratives in 
Children’s Literature (New York/London: Garland, 1998), 3. 
14
 Morten Bøås, ‘Uganda in the Regional War Zone: Meta-Narratives, Pasts and Presents’, Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies 23, no.3 (2004): 283-303, 284. 
15
 Stephens and McCallum, Retelling Stories, 4. 
16
 Bøås, ‘Uganda’, 284. 
17
 Jean-Francois Lyotard, for example, points to the constitutive effects of meta-theories for the truth claims of 
theories; analogously basic meta-narratives determine form and functions of narratives. Lyotard, Das postmoderne 
Wissen. Ein Bericht (Graz/Wien: Böhlau, 1986), 87-111. 
18
 Lehmann, ‘Homo narrans‘, 66. 
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these stories’ relations with modernity, thus referring to them as ‘modern legends’. For DiFonzo 
and Bordia, for instance, urban legends are ‘stories of unusual, humorous or horrible events that 
contain themes related to the modern world’.19 In this reading, legends evolve in situations which 
create a general need for meaning, as answer to the perceived aimlessness and purposelessness of 
modernity, considering them as ‘a type of logotherapy in that they primarily function as meaning-
making, value-endorsing and mores-promoting stories’.20 While it is plausible that urban legends 
fulfil these functions, it would be misleading to merely focus on their relation to modernity. 
Indeed, while contemporary legends have a ‘modern’ outlook, they are most often rooted in much 
older stories, which in some cases have been traced back several hundred years.
21
 Others put their 
definition’s stress on the adjective ‘urban’. Fine, for example, argues that the ‘urbanity’ of the 
stories is their setting and content, which assumedly revolves around ‘behaviours and institutions 
characteristic of urban life. [...They] reflect the perceived dangers of the urban environment, 
especially its size, heterogeneity, and anonymity’.22 However, while the ‘urban’ as main subject 
may be a subset of urban legends (and a vivid one despite claims of a decline in storytelling due 
to TV and internet), our understanding is that in intervention contexts these stories are rather told 
in urban surroundings, that is, the city where peacebuilders gather and tell their stories.  
A general characteristic of urban legends is their social embeddedness: they are narrated 
between members of a fairly homogenous group. This is the case when a group of professionals – 
in the context of international interventions: soldiers and civilian workers of international 
organisations – are producers as well as recipients of urban legends. Being told within a fairly 
homogenous group, it is also important for legends’ credibility that they are set in familiar 
environments – not in the immediate social vicinity, but close enough that one knows some of the 
places involved. At a minimum, locations must be demarcated as comparable to known settings – 
above-mentioned ‘second hand’ experience facilitates understanding. Especially, listeners ought 
to be familiar with the social proceedings that are described. Stories are furthermore connected to 
                                                        
19
 Nicholas DiFonzo and Prashant Bordia, ‘Rumor, Gossip and Urban Legends’, Diogenes, no.213 (2007): 19-35, 28; 
cf. also Ronald L. Baker, ‘The Influence of Mass Culture on Modern Legends’, Southern Folklore Quarterly 40 
(1976): 367-76. 
20
 Ibid., 28-9. 
21
 Rolf Wilhelm Brednich, Die Spinne in der Yucca-Palme (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), 13-19; and Gillian Bennett, 
‘What’s “Modern” about the Modern Legend?’, Fabula 26 (1985): 219-29. 
22
 Gary Alan Fine, ‘The City as a Folklore Generator. Legends in the Metropolis’, Urban Resources 4, no.3 (1987), 
3-6, 3. 
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a person’s authority as knowledgeable, mostly by relating what supposedly happened to ‘a friend 
of a friend’. The appeal of these stories, however, is not only related to their social 
embeddedness. Telling them is a performative act, and the stories’ structure is well designed to 
entertain. The stories are usually ‘polished, balanced, focused, and neat’23. 
Finally, urban legends are not static, but tend to migrate and are highly adaptive to 
changes in environment or technology. Even though it is hard to exactly trace migration patterns, 
the fact that the same core plots appear at different times, in different places and across cultures 
hints at their travelling nature. The ‘Vagina Dentata’ legend, which surfaced in different wars, is 
but one example of migratory legends.
24
 As interventions are staffed by a limited number of 
global professionals who travel between different theatres, stories also make their way from the 
Balkans to Africa or Central Asia. Finding such migrating stories is a strong indicator of their 
fictitious nature; however, the question of whether there is a ‘true’ original incident on which a 
story is based is not central to the forms and functions it assumes when being told and re-told by 
different narrators and in different settings – the story develops an independent existence.  
A note on methodological clarification: by disconnecting urban legends of intervention’s 
content from the performance of the act of storytelling and from their performativity in creating 
intervention realities, we highlight the story told at the expense of how it is told and what effects 
it has. Our analysis thus remains at a level of content akin to literary analysis.
25
 The reason for 
this is the way in which we have collected the stories – namely through academics and 
practitioners telling us about legends, rather than observing the act of storytelling ourselves. This 
also requires them being aware of the concept of urban legends and identifying them in everyday 
talk. We are aware that the omission of performances downplays the bonding and group cohesion 
                                                        
23
 Brunvand, Too Good to Be True, 19. This is what makes them attractive for newspapers and other news outlets, 
despite urban legends’ quality as oral genre. Brunvand, who also highlights the role of the internet for disseminating 
parody urban legends (ibid., 473-4), and Brednich have shown that urban legends often find their way into 
newspapers and other formal media, thereby being ‘ennobled’ as part of formal, reliable information. Brednich 
points to surveys according to which 18 per cent of respondents claimed to have read urban legends in papers, while 
7 per cent had heard them on radio or TV. We can thus assume that urban legends are sometimes transferred from 
the oral, informal to the written, formal realm, thereby contributing to formal knowledge production. Rolf Wilhelm 
Brednich, Pinguine in Rückenlage. Brandneue sagenhafte Geschichten von heute (München: C. H. Beck, 2004), 10. 
24
 Monte Gulzow and Carol Mitchell, ‘”Vagina Dentata” and “Incurable Venereal Disease”. Legends from the Viet 
Nam War’, Western Folklore 39 (1980): 306-316, 315. 
25
 For a discussion cf. Daniel R. Barnes, ‘Interpreting urban legends’, Nordic Yearbook of Folklore 40 (1984): 67-78. 
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functions as well as the above-mentioned ‘valve’ functions of talk, which can be extremely 
significant in the ghettoized circumstances peacebuilders may find themselves in. We therefore 
cannot explain exactly how telling stories constructs relations between groups, has effect in the 
moment and creates forms of solidarity, envy, credibility. We are also aware that our analysis 
lacks focus on performativity, which would allow for deeper insights into the subjectivity-
shaping and meaning-making functions of storytelling. All these aspects are beyond the scope of 
this analysis, but we hope to prepare the ground for such research – for example, the application 
of ethnographical methods to analyse the act and the broader social context of telling urban 
legends of intervention. For the time being, and as a first step, we analyse urban legends for 
content and repeating themes that allow for conclusions about the meta-narratives of 
peacebuilding. 
 
 
Exploring the meta-narratives of peacebuilding: a sample of urban legends of intervention 
 
Oral, informal forms of knowledge production and dissemination are seldom taken into account 
in research on international peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions, as interventions are 
highly bureaucratic endeavours displaying the typical characteristics of modern administration, 
not least the importance of documenting official processes.
26
 Modern bureaucracies in general, 
and international interventions more specifically, are based on written culture. This results in the 
production of standardised written texts like evaluation, monitoring and benchmarking reports, 
strategy papers, road maps, action plans and memorandums – which are often used as primary 
sources for academic analysis. Functionally, documents are the only means of institutional 
memory, as interventions generally have a much higher turnover than other 
professional/governance environments. Short periods of deployment, rotation of assigned duties 
and adaptation to different contexts require at least some information that staff can rely on. 
Furthermore, formal texts are the main line of communication between the ‘three coupled arenas’ 
                                                        
26
 Despite accounts to the contrary, which list lack of documentation as an important source for inefficient, 
unsustainable projects run by intervention agencies; this, however, is usually used to describe aberrant practices and 
exceptions to the rule – in any way, they reify that formality ought to be the guiding norm. Paul Fishstein and 
Andrew Wilder, Winning hearts and minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan 
(Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, 2011), 47-50. 
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of the intervention: the western headquarters of the intervening states and organisations, the 
national base camps in the capital of the intervened country, and the local office branches and 
projects.
27
 
For our research the base camp is the most important arena of intervention. It is the 
central site of formal knowledge production. Its main task is to collect information, which is then 
processed in two ways: it is used for further planning and ‘condensed into reports’ for western 
headquarters. The official documents circulating between these arenas dominate the public 
discourse about goals, achievements, failings and lessons learned. They also constitute a main 
source for researchers. Yet these formal texts are far from representing the voices and stories of 
all those who participate in, or are affected by, the intervention. Therefore, it is also here at the 
base camp where internationals of different agencies meet and exchange their knowledge – not 
least by informal communication that often contests formal, official representations to some 
extent. These encounters provide the site where ‘intersubjective knowledge of local problems and 
external solutions is generated’.28 It is also here were most urban legends of intervention are told 
and retold.  
In the following, we discuss a sample of the urban legends of intervention collected in our 
project. Some were reported by field researchers and practitioners at international conferences, 
others have been sent in by email or via our project website www.legends-of-intervention.com. 
This approach was chosen for practical reasons and we are aware that it comes with caveats, 
especially that informants are prone to report the more spectacular stories and omit/are unaware 
of the more mundane ones, and that reporting about a legend does not allow to study the legend 
in its narrative performance contexts. The stories are clustered following a content-based 
categorisation that serves, first, to take stock of the types of stories circulating in international 
intervention settings, and second, to trace these types of contents back to underlying meta-
narratives that inform the way in which actors frame the intervention. The contents so far reveal 
three broad analytical categories: (1) stories about ‘the intervened’ which have the meta-narrative 
of local barbarianism in common; (2) stories about ‘the interveners’, i.e. peacebuilders and other 
members of the aid community, which cluster around meta-narratives of western/northern 
                                                        
27
 Alex Veit and Klaus Schlichte, ‘Three arenas. The conflictive logics of external statebuilding’, in Statebuilding 
and State-Formation. The political sociology of intervention, ed. Berit Bliesemann de Guevara (London/New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 167-181. 
28
 Ibid., 174. 
 10 
arrogance and feelings of superiority; and (3) stories about failed intercultural interaction, whose 
meta-narrative is one of misunderstandings among interveners and intervened and of intervention 
failure. 
 
 
Legends about ‘the intervened’: variations on barbarianism 
 
A first stock of stories deals, in the broadest sense, with the barbarianism of ‘the locals’, coded in 
different graduations and ways. Sub-categories include educational, organisational and/or 
technical backwardness and topics such as cannibalism and magic. The following are four 
examples of this type: 
 
The Afghan Footbath 
 
The military decided to set up Camp Warehouse, just outside Kabul, on premises that had partly 
been used as barracks before, but at the time were mainly an empty field. In the beginning, 
pioneer troops had to share one toilet in the only remaining building of the compound. Even 
worse, the “toilet” was only a hole in the ground. Hence, mobile toilets were soon ordered and, 
after a few weeks of delays and trouble, finally delivered. Before they could be used, however, 
soldiers realized that many of the Afghan construction workers hired to set up the camp’s 
infrastructure had blue feet. As it turned out, absent other cleaning facilities, Afghans had chosen 
to wash their feet in the toilets before prayer. It took some time to convince them that this was not 
the intended purpose of the “portaloos”.29 
  
Charging Cell Phones in Afghanistan 
 
In north-eastern Afghanistan, in the high and remote mountain ranges of Badakhshan, people went 
to aid agencies’ offices to charge their mobile phones. After a while, electricity provided by a 
generator was supplied to a whole neighbourhood, planned and funded by the international 
community. The supply only worked for some days, however, namely until someone opened one 
of the electrical pillars, ignorant that the currency in this transformer was several hundred volts. 
                                                        
29
 Source: Story collected by Florian Kühn, Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg, based on interviews with German 
military personnel, Kabul, May 2006. 
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Of course, there was no plug either, but they tried to connect the charger to the cables anyway, 
thereby short-circuiting the whole thing and setting it ablaze. The whole thing burned down, and a 
new generator building had expensively to be built and equipped.
30
 
 
Communications in the Congo 
 
It is impossible to face the problems of Congo with the actual force and system in place. The 
information has to travel thousands of kilometres in a country where the communications and 
transport system is almost inexistent. As an example, we were informed recently of the 
information trail relating to two armed men that crossed the border here in Gisenyi. This 
information followed the normal channels. It was reported to the headquarters in Goma; from 
there it was passed to the High Commander in North Kivu and from North Kivu onto Kinshasa. 
To verify the information the High Commander in North Kivu asked, “Is it confirmed that they are 
carrying arms?” The headquarters in Goma could not confirm because they had not seen the 
armed men, so they said, “No.” As a result the information transmitted to Kinshasa was, “Soldiers 
crossing border unconfirmed.” Kinshasa threw the communication out in the rubbish bin.31 
 
The Over-valued JuJu 
 
Belief in certain invulnerability and supernatural spiritual powers is widespread in many parts of 
Liberia today. In everyday language, these powers are called “JuJu”. Thus, if someone has a lot of 
JuJu, he is invulnerable, that’s what people believe. [...] Well, in Liberia in 2010 the following 
happened. A man claimed to have an extraordinary JuJu. In order to prove this, he asked his friend 
to shoot him three times with a shotgun. He said he would survive the shots without any injuries. 
[…] First, his friend hesitated, but […] finally shot him. Little surprisingly, the guy who was shot 
died. Now, serious crimes like murder and homicide have to be brought to a formal court in 
Liberia. […] Little surprisingly, in such a court there are no legal norms on how to deal with 
overvalued JuJu. It seems to have taken a while, and also some consultations with the UN rule of 
law section, until the judge felt able to close the case. In the end, the man was discharged. There 
were sufficient witnesses who confirmed the event. And, of course, the shooter could not be 
                                                        
30
 Source: Story documented from personal conversation by Florian Kühn with a project coordinator at the German 
Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), approx. 2008. 
31
 Source: Story provided by Marta Iñiguez de Heredia, London School of Economics, based on an interview with a 
diplomat on his impressions of the UN Mission in Congo, Goma, July 2009. 
 12 
blamed for the other guy’s bad JuJu.32 
 
The ‘Afghan Footbath’ story is set in newly post-Taliban Kabul, in a situation where interaction 
between stabilisation forces and local population worked unprotected and unpredicted. It is set in 
a familiar setting – everyone who ever worked in Kabul knows Camp Warehouse. The legend 
idealises the early days of the intervention for their assumed peacefulness. The main topic, 
however, is the interaction with the local population, which is one between divergent levels of 
technological knowledge. In this sense, the story works to portray Afghans as ‘unfit to even know 
a toilet’, as one soldier remarked.33 ‘Charging Cell Phones in Afghanistan’ works along very 
similar lines. In ‘Communications in the Congo’ the degree of backwardness is less pronounced; 
nonetheless, the Congolese army officers are criticised for not mastering the most basic rules of 
intra-organisational communication. In ‘The Over-valued JuJu’ local superstition is the main 
theme and again backwardness, this time in cultural terms, the main message.  
All four examples belong to the broader theme of local barbarianism, yet in different 
shades. Although these legends explicitly refer to contemporary settings, their general content 
can be traced back to much older forms of engagement of European with non-European societies 
in colonialism and imperialism. All the above stories use well-known stereotypes and are highly 
recognisable for a culturally western audience. By presenting ‘the local’ in intervention contexts 
as mysterious, threatening and/or backward, they contain exotic, culturalist and sometimes 
overtly racist notions that come together in the worldview described as orientalism.
34
 This is most 
                                                        
32
 Story provided by Hannah Neumann, Coordinator/Researcher of the International Research Network Cultures of 
Intervention (CoINet), Berlin 2011. 
33
 Interviews (Florian Kühn) with military personnel, Kabul, May 2006. A similar bottom line was conveyed by an 
account of a German police project leader, who traced back desertions to the unfamiliar luxury that Afghan police 
cadets experience at German training facilities in Afghanistan: ‘When these guys [e.g. the cadets] come to our place, 
it is the first time in their lives that they sleep in proper beds. We often found the plumbing to be blocked by stones. 
That is because these guys usually go to a field to ‘do their business’ and use a handful of stones to clean themselves. 
When they do that in a proper bathroom, they of course block the tubes. We usually had to teach them how to use 
toilet paper. Many of them deserted when later they were deployed to remote places where they found they had to 
live in holes rather than in the luxurious quarters of the training academy, as that wasn’t what they had imagined’ 
(former leader of the German bilateral police project in Kabul; presentation held at Atlantic Academy spring 
academy, Lambrecht, 15 March 2012, collected by Florian Kühn). 
34
 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 1979); Maria Todorova, Imagining the 
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visible in another set of legends that belong into this category: cannibalism legends. Oliver 
Richmond, for instance, reports: 
 
I first heard this story in DRC, Ituri, and this was told to me by, I think, some Croatian 
peacekeepers [...]. They were pretty worried, because they had heard these graphic stories about 
peacekeepers who had been captured and had literally been suspended over a pot – alive. I did a 
lot of research [...] and found out that these stories were pieces in the news across the world. And, 
increasingly, it’s a graphic story about a spit and a pot and hot water and spices and all that kind of 
thing. [...] I also remember, in the Congo it has been used as a way of highlighting the dangers of 
being on patrol for peacekeepers and constructing, if you like, a security discourse about the 
dangers of peacekeeping.
35
 
 
What is significant regarding the cannibalism legends is that they seem to follow an underlying 
script that comes to the fore in the graphic elements of storytelling. Much more obviously than 
other barbarianism legends, these legends resort to older narratives about ‘the savage’, hinting at 
old, deep roots of such legends and their foundation in folk beliefs and literature, which are 
reproduced in contemporary popular culture (cf. ‘belief legends’36). 
 
 
Legends about ‘the interveners’: variations on arrogance and supposed superiority 
 
Stories about ‘the interveners’ in peacebuilding and development contexts are told by both local 
and international narrators. It is thus important to note the source of a story. In the following, we 
focus exclusively on legends told by international narrators:
37
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The Template Report 
 
The UN recently published a report on its action in the [DR Congo]. Surprisingly enough, entire 
sections of this document focused on East Timor. The organization launched an internal inquiry to 
determine the reasons behind this puzzling discrepancy. It discovered that the staff member who 
had prepared the report had just been redeployed from East Timor to the Congo. On arrival in his 
new position, he implemented the exact same strategies in the exact same way he had done in all 
his previous postings. As usual, when reporting time arrived, he took his template report, hit 
“search and find,” and replaced “East Timor” with “the Congo.” This time, he simply missed a 
few occurrences.
38
 
 
The UN-trained Child Soldiers 
 
[Radhika] Coomaraswamy, [UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative for 
Children and Armed Conflict] […] had gone to […] the Congo, and was inspecting the retrained 
Congolese army. And among the lined-up ranks of soldiers there were child soldiers. So, 
obviously, […] Coomaraswamy was supposed to be having a role banning child soldiers, and […] 
there she is, this big delegation concerned about child soldiers, but there she is, the reality is, there 
are child soldiers in the very front of her.
39
 
 
Kosovo Customs 
 
In Kosovo [...] there is this kind of discourse of internationals about locals, “Did he know who I 
am?” [...]. I actually heard that from an international working at the OSCE who had been held up 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
prominently among them peacekeeping as paid leisure, hidden economic agendas as drivers of peacebuilders, and the 
idea that a country’s women must be the reason for foreign (mostly male) peacekeepers to participate in 
interventions. 
38
 Source: Severine Autessere, The Trouble with the Congo - Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 84. Autesserre stresses the migratory nature of this 
legend: ‘Depending on whether I was in Kosovo, the Congo, or Afghanistan, I heard different versions of it applied 
to the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), or the International Monetary Fund […]’; ibid. 
39
 Source: Literal transcript of a story reported by Vanessa Pupavac, University of Nottingham, recorded at the 
conference ‘Conflict, Intervention and the Politics of Knowledge’, hosted by the Humanitarian and Conflict 
Response Institute at the University of Manchester, 25-26 November 2010. 
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at the border and had been actually responsible for the drafting of the customs laws in Kosovo. 
And she was held up by a customs officer who was simply doing his job. And she turned around, 
and she told me this story, she turned around and said, “Do you know who I am? I drafted these 
laws!” 40 
 
Sacred Cows in Kosovo 
 
A local cattle herder was walking on the road with his animals, when he saw a UN police car 
coming up with high speed. He wanted to get his cows out of the way and started beating them 
with the stick he was carrying. The UN police car stopped and out jumped an angry UN police 
officer. He started yelling at the farmer and threatened him with punishment. What had happened? 
The police officer was a Hindu from India for whom cows are sacred.
41
 
 
‘The Template Report’ works differently with different audiences. To the critical outside 
observer who is not involved in interventions, it deals with both the problem of peacebuilding 
blueprints or one-size-fits-all models and the high turnovers in intervention agencies. Both topics 
have been discussed at length in peacebuilding literature and evolved into common knowledge as 
core problems of peacebuilding that root in bureaucratic organisation necessities. For a critical 
observer, the story thus illustrates well her general scepticism towards interventions. Yet, the 
story also appeals to those who staff intervention agencies.
42
 Their criticism is mainly directed 
against donors’ demands and squishy directives that the aid workers ‘on the ground’ have to react 
to. ‘UN-trained Child Soldiers’ specifically mocks a representative of the highest decision-
making level in interventions and can thus also be understood as both an external and internal 
critique of UN missions. 
‘Kosovar Customs’ is also concerned with a specific individual within the broader 
category of ‘the interveners’. This story is interesting because again it means different things to 
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 Cf. for example Ben Ramalingam ‘The Genesis of Aid (A Parody)’, 28 February 2012, 
http://aidontheedge.info/2012/02/28/the-genesis-of-aid/ (accessed 4 March 2012)   
 16 
different narrators and/or audiences. The source claims to have been the OSCE person in the 
story herself; so we can assume that the story was not told to illustrate the international mind-set, 
as might be the first association, but to underline a claim made with regard to the Kosovo 
Albanians’ new role as state representatives after the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s 
independence in early 2008. Yet, the story travelled and also changed its message. In September 
2008 one of the authors heard it from a UN legal officer in Prishtina who told the legend to 
illustrate the levels of arrogance she had noticed in some international staff towards locals. In this 
version, the core of the legend was the idea of double standards of those internationals who 
attempt to exempt themselves from local authority and assume a quasi-colonial attitude. 
‘Sacred Cows in Kosovo’ illustrates the different themes a single urban legend can 
comprehend. The story was first collected on a research trip to the KFOR field camp in Prizren, 
Kosovo, in June 2004. During an informal gathering in the field camp, the researchers asked a 
CIMIC officer of the German Armed Forces about the most important problems of the 
intervention in Kosovo. The CIMIC officer pointed among other things to difficulties arising 
from the internal structure and multinational composition of the UN agencies in Kosovo. He told 
the story, which he claimed to have heard from someone working at the UN Mission in Kosovo, 
to illustrate his point. A few weeks later, the author heard the same story again, at a small 
conference in Konjic, Bosnia and Herzegovina. A west-European researcher used the story as 
anecdotic introduction to his talk on the role and effectiveness of the UN interim administration 
in Kosovo. In both cases, the stated intention to tell the story was to illustrate organisational 
problems of the intervention. Yet, the story’s main appeal is its inherent culturalism. The main 
topic is not the interaction between locals and internationals as such, but the exotism and 
educational backwardness of certain UN staff, namely Indian police officers. In this sense, the 
orientalism informing legends about ‘the intervened’ is repeated here with regard to UN staff 
with non-western background. 
 
 
Legends about intercultural interaction: variations on misunderstanding and failure 
 
The third broad category in our collection of urban legends deals with misunderstandings 
between ‘the intervened’ and ‘the interveners’ and the resulting failure of aid projects. Here are 
three typical examples (see also ‘The Successful Condom Distribution’ above): 
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Chicken Farms in Liberia 
 
Someone at UNMIL had the great idea to rope local villages in for egg production. Normally, in 
Liberia people do not keep chickens for egg production. But UNMIL seemed to need lots of eggs. 
Now, there was this idea, I think it was the PX, that one could build chicken farms for the villages, 
give them some chickens and a bit of feed for the first months, and then buy all the eggs from 
them. This way, UNMIL would have enough eggs, the villages would have an income, and 
everything would be fine. So far, so good. The chicken farms were built – simply concrete walls 
with plastic foil spanned across a wooden construction to serve as roof. They also brought 
chickens and feed to the communities and explained that they would come back to buy the eggs. 
This worked for exactly six months – as long as the collection of eggs was accompanied by new 
feed for the chickens. After this period, the communities were supposed to buy feed themselves, 
using the receipts from the egg production. Yet, either nobody had explained them this idea, or 
they had just forgotten it, or there was no feed to buy. Anyway, the chickens grew skinnier, and at 
some point the villagers took pity on them and ate the chickens. No chickens, no eggs, no feed, no 
UNMIL visits any more. Yet many villages now have churches that look surprisingly alike...
43
 
 
Charging Cell Phones in Liberia 
 
[S]ome nice NGO workers […] wanted to be as open as possible to the Liberians. So they started 
to allow people in the neighbourhood where they had their office to come in and charge their 
mobile phones. At first, there was just one, then it was two, then it was three, then it was four, 
five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten. And then one day they couldn’t work anymore because […] their 
whole office was full of Liberians who came there to charge their cell phones. In fact, they 
couldn’t, even if they had managed to get some physical space, they couldn’t work because all 
their computers had been unplugged and removed from the sockets by Liberians who wanted to 
charge their cell phones.
44
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 Source: Story sent in by Hannah Neumann, Coordinator/Researcher of the International Research Network 
Cultures of Intervention (CoINet), Berlin. 
44
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The Village Well Project 
 
There was a village that got a well, dug by German development workers of the German Society 
for Technical Cooperation. The well was built in the middle of the village in order to stymie 
complaints about different distances people would have to walk to get to the well. The old well 
was far outside the village and women had been tasked to walk and bring the water back. The time 
at the well, as well as the time walking there, however, had been the only time women were 
outside of the control of men, which was also a good opportunity for them to talk to other women. 
By digging the well in the centre of the village where they could be observed all the time, the 
development experts had breached many of their directives, of which a central one is 
empowerment of women.
45
 
 
An alternative ending to this story goes even further and contains a slightly changed moral: 
 
Since the well was in the middle of the village, where everyone was able to see the women collect 
and carry the water, henceforth, men had to carry the water, as women in local tradition have to be 
kept from the sights of other men. Thus, the women were even more confined to the houses and 
lost some freedom thanks to the development assistance – at the same time, men were forced to 
assume some of those formerly women’s duties.46 
 
Although these legends also contain traces of the local barbarianism theme, those who are most 
ridiculed here are ‘the interveners’, who despite their knowledge and high educational standard 
are unable to prevent their projects or the interaction with local stakeholders from failing. The 
main focus of these stories is on how local populations appropriate development projects in 
multi-faceted and clever ways. With regard to ‘The Village Well Project’, the two different 
versions illustrate once more the fluidity of stories; the details may vary whenever the stories are 
re-told, but their characteristics remain untouched. The locals in these stories behave other than 
expected in their reaction to externally provided aid; however, their actions are explicable within 
their own logics, which only partly overlap with the aid agencies’ intentions. Both endings seem 
to indicate that external assistance is unaware of local contexts, thus triggering unintended 
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 Source: Alternative version supplied by Florian Kühn, unrecorded source. 
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consequences. In effect, ‘ownership’ of development projects by local populations changes its 
meaning: even though building a well may follow the best of intentions and seems a sensible 
thing to do, the social practices surrounding it in the often delicately balanced social relations of 
target countries may transform what is being offered in unanticipated ways. The story’s moral 
appears to be that ‘whatever you do, it is not in your hands’. 
 
 
Storytelling and peacebuilding: functions of urban legends of intervention 
 
How do we make sense of the (meta-)narratives of intervention that surface in urban legends? In 
order to analytically grasp the plurality of official and unofficial representations, we follow 
Scott’s differentiation between public and hidden transcripts and Heathershaw’s adaptation of 
this concept to the context of interventions.
47
 We adapt Scott’s ideas without his strict appliance 
to hierarchical power relationships. Indeed, in the practice of interventions it is sometimes hard to 
tell who calls the shots – hence, we make use of the distinction of official and virtually private 
narratives, but abstain from deducing formalised patterns of subordination. 
Public transcripts are made up of the dominant discourses and practices in a given context 
– it is what Scott calls the ‘respectable performance’.48 In the case of the discourse of 
intervention, they can be found in official documents and testimonies, in government and 
international agencies’ reports, and in public events and appearances, which usually ‘narrate a 
simplistic schema of liberal intervention’, that does not account for the perspective of the 
recipients of intervention or the private views of peacebuilding personnel.
49
 The power of the 
public transcript is limited – it cannot reach into the private realm of communication –, but it is at 
the same time powerful in that it keeps certain perspectives from becoming part of the public 
discourse. 
Hidden transcripts describe the discourses and practices that form an alternative, often 
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hidden reality and have ‘a fairly extensive offstage social existence’.50 As long as the public 
transcripts are not openly contested, hidden transcripts strengthen and stabilise dominant 
discourse. While Scott is most interested in the ‘infrapolitics of subordinate groups’ and notions 
of resistance, he stresses that dominant groups too have hidden transcripts that are incoherent 
with the public ones and that they too are subjected to the rules of the public transcript; it would 
thus be simplifying to conflate public transcripts with dominance and hidden transcripts with 
critique/resistance. Public and hidden transcripts may have the same author, but target different 
audiences and are subject to different constraints of power. They are ‘dialectically related’: they 
cannot be reduced to simple binary categories like false/true or bad/good, but influence each 
other’s emergence.51 Of Scott’s four varieties of political discourse that constitute the hidden 
transcript, the ‘politics of disguise and anonymity that takes place in public view but is designed 
to have a double meaning or to shield the identity of the actors’ is of specific interest for this 
research: ‘[r]umor, gossip, folktales, jokes, songs, rituals, codes, and euphemisms – a good part 
of the folk culture of subordinate groups – fit this description’.52 
The public transcript of contemporary interventions in international relations, which 
informs official, written, formalised communication and official encounters bweteen interveners 
and intervened, is based on western liberal ideology. International interventions have increasingly 
referred to the security of the individual and thereby projected norms extrapolated from the social 
space of the liberal state onto the global space. Within the concept of ‘global governance’, it is 
assumed that what classically ought to be the state’s business is now everyone’s in a global 
‘responsibility to protect’.53 For the public transcript of liberal peacebuilding interventions, 
‘[m]uch of the assessment and evaluation that takes place is conducted by internationals, not 
locals or even independent organisations, from within the liberal peacebuilding system, meaning 
that these processes become circular’.54 Since international (often western) agents dominate the 
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public intervention discourse and advertise a state model that is derived from the liberal state, 
self-referentially ‘the liberal state is the only solution to contemporary conflict’, thus obviating to 
evaluate the very liberal state as a source of conflict.
55
 
Merging, or at least confusing, cause and effects of liberal statehood also conflates 
distinct phenomena, constructing causalities: in these scripts, poor people and those lacking 
proper education will become terrorists – despite evidence to the contrary. As Duffield points out, 
comparable arguments were made during decolonisation, linking poverty with communism.
56
 
Politically serving a distinction between ‘standards of civilization’,57 such circularities serve to 
explain why interventions take place in the first place. Where ‘human security’ is lacking, states 
are disempowered and global governance regimes step in to rectify shortcomings. Local political 
arrangements are denigrated for their seemingly obvious inability to regulate, and international 
actors circumscribe sovereignty to act on behalf of enlightened modernity. The human security 
paradigm, within which contemporary interventions take place at least declaratorily, puts 
individuals at its centre, whilst in fact, as Duffield notes, ‘it can be more accurately understood as 
effective states prioritizing the well-being of populations living within ineffective ones’.58 This 
contains the organisational myth
59
 of benignly and temporarily taking on responsibilities. Also, it 
mythologises military engagement as in support of development programmes, while, with similar 
credibility, development action might be read as a supporting element of security or a military 
campaign.
60
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The hidden transcripts of current interventions, of which urban legends are part, must be 
read against the background of public discourse and performances. The official narrative is 
dominated by the intervening agencies – they demarcate what is possible in official perceptions 
and evaluations of the intervention – and reproduced by all actors, international and local, who 
participate in public performances that adhere to the official script. Scepticism on the part of 
individual intervention agents and dissident local perspectives on the intervention, but also more 
radical interpretations of the ‘situation on the ground’ are mainly sidelined in official accounts. 
They surface in the hidden transcripts of two ‘author groups’: the interveners themselves and 
local actors. In this article, we have focused on the first group, the international agents of the 
intervention. There are at least three main sources for hidden transcripts of ‘the interveners’.  
The first source is inconsistencies between the public transcript of intervention and 
peacebuilders’ everyday experiences. During field trips, researchers commonly experience that 
their interviewees have a lot to say off the record and may reveal contradictions that arise 
between ‘ideal’ and ‘reality’. Heathershaw concludes from his fieldwork that, 
 
the regularity of such dissent indicated more than merely the stresses and strains of implementing 
challenging programmes in a difficult environment. Rather, these “hidden” accounts express 
doubts about the ethical, spatial and temporal parameters of the public transcript. They suggest 
that particularity and context is considerably more important than the idea of the universal or 
universalisable the International Community supposes.
61
 
 
 A second source of the internationals’ hidden transcript is the impenetrability of the 
situation of intervention ‘on the ground’. For the intervening states and organisations, the local 
situation is often opaque, and ‘[k]nowledge construction is characterized by high levels of 
uncertainty’.62 To make sense of what is happening politically may be difficult, while interaction 
with local intermediaries is often a source of ambiguity and mistrust. Duffield points to racist 
undercurrents, fostering mistrust and suspicion on practical as well as conceptual levels.
63
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Furthermore, intervention agencies compete with other agencies for knowledge, projects and 
funding – factors which also shape the way in which official reports are written and encounters 
performed.
64
 Here, the hidden transcript may come in to fill knowledge voids, to make sense of 
‘the local’ and/or of the intervention, and to provide orientation in an uncertain situation. 
 The third main source of the hidden transcript is the intervention as a social and living 
environment.
65
 In intervention settings, especially in strained security environments, 
communication within the group of international professionals is most intense. This is due to a 
lack of outside contacts (e.g. friends outside the professional circle), hierarchical relations with 
locals (e.g. drivers or subordinate project workers), or simple language constraints (informal, 
personal conversations work better in mother tongue or in English/French). Generally, the 
cosmopolitan outlook of personnel of international organisations, as in the field of aid and 
development, furthers a certain mental disposition for how the world is perceived. This is, 
however, not a universalist, inclusive perception of the world, but one which is rooted in highly 
particular western-liberal social backgrounds, ideas and values.
66
 These worldviews are 
reproduced in informal encounters between the internationals, which serve to bond and built 
‘communal identity. […] “The Africans”, “the Afghanis” are often described as different from 
the rational, non-corrupt, and hard-working Westerner’.67 The often paternalistic attitudes are 
reinforced by ‘competition about insidership’: within the community of intervention workers, 
claims to have better insight into local culture, superior contacts to the population or politicians, 
or grasp of the security dynamics are sometimes used as markers of social distinction.
68
 On the 
                                                        
64
 Veit and Schlichte, ‘Arenas‘, 172-5. 
65
 Lisa Smirl, ‘Building the Other, Constructing Ourselves: Spatial Dimensions of International Humanitarian 
Response’, International Political Sociology 2, no.3 (2008): 236- 253; and Lisa Smirl, ‘The State we are(n’t) in: 
Liminal Subjectivity in Aid Worker Auto- Biographies’, in Statebuilding and State-Formation. The political 
sociology of intervention, ed. Berit Bliesemann de Guevara (London/New York: Routledge, 2012), 230-245. 
66
 Catherine Goetze and Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, ‘The “Statebuilding Habitus”: International Civil Servants in 
Kosovo’, in Statebuilding and State-Formation. The political sociology of intervention, ed. Berit Bliesemann de 
Guevara (London/New York: Routledge, 2012), 198-213; and Catherine Goetze and Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, 
‘Cosmopolitanism and the culture of peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies (2014): DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S026021051300051X. 
67
 Schlichte and Veit, Arenas, 21; see Pierre Clastres, Staatsfeinde. Studien zur politischen Anthropologie (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), 13-23. 
68
 Schlichte and Veit, Arenas, 21. A similar tendency can be observed among researchers. 
 24 
positive side, the quest for insidership can also reflect the practitioners’ genuine attempt to be 
self-reflective and to ‘do no harm’ to the society they are working in,69 and urban legends of 
intervention may be one source among many providing clues for interveners’ self-reflexivity. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
What can research on urban legends of intervention contribute to the vast body of academic work 
on international interventionism? In this article, we have shown how folklorist-inspired literary 
analysis of urban legends can be used to explore meta-narratives that shape frames of knowledge 
production in interventions. Three broad meta-narratives became visible within which urban 
legends serve to make sense of intervention contexts: barbarianism, Western/Northern hubris and 
cultural misunderstandings. These meta-narratives are not neatly distinct, but constitute each 
other: local barbarianism is the flipside of interveners’ hubris, and both come together in 
narratives of cultural misunderstandings.  
A surprisingly recurrent pattern in the collected stories is orientalism. While most aid 
workers would probably deny drawing on such simplistic frames, further research would have to 
establish how ‘othering’ in the course of an intervention (unconsciously) works and influences 
policy-making and implementation. With the exception of parts of the military, where reference 
to a ‘southern mentality’ is often openly made, orientalism is generally seen as ‘politically 
incorrect’ by practitioners for its dichotomising, simplifying and naturalising effects. Urban 
legends of intervention, however, may be the area where such cognitive undercurrents resurface. 
Unconsciously present mental dispositions of orientalism may find their valve in urban legends of 
intervention, as telling and re-telling these stories is a safe way of making unspeakable ideas 
‘speakable’. Telling these stories involves intellectual distancing, which limits the danger of 
being socially reprimanded: as true accounts and something that happened to ‘a colleague of a 
colleague’, the blame would go to an unspecified source rather than the chronicler.  
As some of the discussed stories have suggested, however, urban legends are highly 
ambiguous in that a single story can be told in different ways, changing contexts and with 
different message or moral. What in one story appears as badly disguised prejudice may in 
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another be a self-reflexive attempt to account or sensitize for local traditions and culture. Also, 
the ambiguous nature of the stories opens them up for strategic use: when development agencies 
give advice to their staff on how to use storytelling to illustrate their work, this is instrumental for 
the organisation.
70
 In this sense, the meta-narratives say little about the immediate social context 
and functions of storytelling. What the meta-narratives do suggest, however, is that urban legends 
of intervention in general, including the seemingly more critical ones, do not challenge the 
general ideology of liberal peacebuilding, but draw on the same meta-narratives that underpin 
interventions, especially the idea of world society’s uneven civilization and the challenges of the 
civilizing mission. In other words, orientalist undercurrents of the hidden transcript underscore 
the official discourse about deficient statehood and conflict-prone societies that is built into the 
discourse, practice and structure of liberal intervention. 
While observing and analysing the performance of storytelling has been beyond the scope 
of this article, further research will have to re-construct the particularly intended message. Based 
on intervention research literature, we have suggested possible functions of urban legends for 
intervening actors and used Scott’s ideas of transcripts to locate and organise the murky sphere 
between the public and hidden narratives and performances of the interveners. In the context of 
international interventions, Scott’s concept can only work if the hierarchical pattern and stress on 
the emancipative quality of hidden transcripts are qualified. As a prerequisite, as Heathershaw 
has noted, establishing the dialectics of the political role urban legends of intervention play for 
actors making sense of reality is vital. In the case of Western ‘interveners’, individual stories 
need to be related to the more universal, and often highly stereotyped, underlying meta-
narratives. With these categories, derived from a number of stories’ morals, we can map existing 
storylines; a further step is to explore how these storylines work argumentatively and how 
different actors plug into them to further their cause.
71
 This, as well as the performance and 
performativity of urban legends of intervention, is a task for future research. 
This article has shown how the literary analysis of urban legends of intervention can be 
used as a method through which meta-narratives with deep roots and long life cycles that shape 
political framings can be traced – not only in contexts of intervention, but also in international 
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politics more generally. Studied in a more comprehensive way, the narrative side of international 
politics may prove to be much more relevant than IR theorizing would so far have it. 
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